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Abstract 
 
To be concerned about data privacy in the fitness 
tracking world is apparently not the question of age or 
fitness level. It also does not necessarily influence the 
actual use of fitness tracking technologies. In this 
empirical study, 590 participants from the EU and 
USA, who are current users, former users or non-users 
of fitness tracking applications, were surveyed (online) 
on their sensitivity perception of several data pieces 
collected with fitness trackers as well as their data 
privacy concerns. Furthermore, subgroups of different 
fitness tracking users were detected based on their 
different privacy unconcerns. 
 
1. Introduction  
Today, ubiquitous technologies spread rapidly in 
different spheres of our lives. Even though the use of 
these technologies is not forced on anybody, the shift 
towards increased application of digital goods and new 
trends appears omnipresent and somewhat inevitable. 
The adoption of these new trends can be based on 
genuine interest or gained benefits, but also on social 
pressure or the need to belong. Depending on many 
factors, the usage of these technologies might feel safe 
and solely beneficial or it can be accompanied by 
uneasy feeling, e.g., of being dependent, surveilled or, 
in general, uncertain of the security of personal data 
collected or generated with this technology. One good 
example are the users of fitness tracking and similar 
wearable technologies, who apply them while often 
having many concerns about privacy risks. Still, in 
order to profit from the (fitness and health) benefits, 
they need to accept the challenges and threats. Data 
privacy and security became one of the prominent 
concerns in this area, especially since wearable 
technology encourages collection, storage and sharing 
of health-related data, which might be perceived as 
more sensitive than the usual name-gender-age 
information, nowadays rather willingly shared on many 
social networks. 
Even though the fitness tracking tools give (health 
and fitness-related) benefits to the consumers, they also 
pose new and partially unpredictable challenging 
threats to data privacy and security. These threats exist 
due to the possibility of ubiquitous collection of large 
amounts of data in real time and creation of detailed 
user behavior patterns, e.g., when people eat, sleep 
(and how good or bad), exercise or go home from work 
[24]. The new tracking devices and applications are 
collecting both, personal information as well as health 
data, and create “a quantified self for their users,” 
which becomes especially risky when the companies 
(being in custody of users’ data) might violate their 
privacy and misuse it [22, 28:13]. 
Activity tracking technologies are collecting 
different kinds of data (e.g., steps, heart rate, sleep 
stages, geolocation), which might be considered to 
have different degrees of sensitivity. This led Lidynia, 
Brauner, and Ziefle [18] to investigate the users’ 
perceived sensitivity of different data types. They 
online-surveyed 82 participants from Germany, where 
46 participants were characterized as non-users of 
wearables and 36 participants as wearable users. Their 
results show that data types such as GPS, sleep 
analysis, and weight are perceived as (rather) sensitive 
in comparison to, for example, step count, hours spent 
standing, and the number of climbed stairs. Lehto and 
Lehto [17] investigated the user perception of privacy 
and sensitivity of health information collected with 
wearable devices as well as their willingness to share 
such information with other parties. The participants of 
their qualitative study “described the information 
collected by their devices as not sensitive, not secret, 
not confidential, and quite general” [17:247]. Even 
though the collected information was not perceived as 
sensitive, some interviewees expressed concerns when 
the data should be connected with individual’s name 
and address. 
Previous studies showed that people are mainly 
concerned about the collection of GPS data [16, 22, 23] 
as well as data about their mood or stress level [23, 25] 
and the detailed health information [23]. This topic 
attracts attention also outside the scientific community. 
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For example, last year, The Guardian reported about 
the case “Fitness tracking app Strava gives away 
location of secret US army bases” [15]. Even though 
this breach was not concerning data collected by daily 
users or runners, it again showed the sensitivity of 
information pieces obtained through different fitness 
applications and which potential risks might be lurking 
[15]. Although people seem to agree on sensitivity of 
location or detailed health data, the users of fitness 
trackers do not express one specific privacy concern 
about data collection on their device, as it appears to 
change depending on various factors [11, 16, 22, 30]. 
Lower concerns or even unconcerns can be explained 
by the lacking awareness of how user privacy can be 
compromised due to collection of “granular data about 
users over a long time” [30:230]. 
In order to identify how do former and current user 
as well as non-users of fitness tracking applications 
perceive sensitivity of several data types collected by 
this technology, we formulate the first research 
question (RQ1): What is the perceived sensitivity of 
different data types by current users, former users, and 
non-users of the fitness tracking applications? 
Not without reason, many users of tracking apps 
have concerns about privacy protection [20], third 
party access to data [7], as well as access of personal 
information by apps [4]. Still, even when users 
understand and care about potential data privacy risks, 
“they feel that once information is shared, it is 
ultimately out of their control. They attribute this to the 
opaque practices of institutions, the technological 
affordances of social media, and the concept of 
networked privacy, which acknowledges that 
individuals exist in social contexts where others can 
and do violate their privacy” [13:3738]. 
Fitness tracking technologies are popular not only 
among the consumers, but also researchers on human-
computer interaction and health informatics. The 
number of studies on activity tracking technologies 
increased over the last years [27]. Recently, it focuses 
more on the ubiquitous data collection and privacy [1, 
5, 6, 24, 25]. Due to the “mobile and networked nature 
of fitness trackers […] they automatically and 
persistently collect data, which companies share with 
or sell to third parties” [30:230]. Although seemingly 
anonymous, the collected user data can be more easily 
re-identified due to the increasing uniqueness of the 
datasets [12, 24]. 
There is scientific interest in users’ behaviors when 
sharing the so-called personal fitness information and 
the privacy concerns coming from the collection, 
aggregation, and sharing of these information pieces 
[30:229]. How sensitive do people perceive their 
fitness information to be? And what data privacy 
concerns do they have? These questions are 
increasingly discussed in context of the so-called 
privacy paradox [1, 3, 5], meaning that even though 
users express some privacy concerns, they “behave in 
ways that appear to undermine their privacy” [30:230]. 
Based on the disagreement regarding what privacy 
concerns about fitness tracking technology do users 
and non-users indeed have, we formulated the second 
research question (RQ2): What are the general privacy 
concerns about fitness tracking by current users, 
former users, and non-users of the fitness tracking 
applications? 
Finally, previous research indicates that some users 
apply fitness tracking applications to the fullest extent 
even though they have data privacy-related concerns 
(so-called privacy paradox). Also, there are users who 
do not voice any specific concerns about the fitness 
tracking technologies. Hence, there appear to exist 
different groups of fitness tracking users when 
considering the state of (perceived) data sensitivity and 
security. This leads us to the final research question 
(RQ3): What types of fitness tracking applications’ 
users can we distinguish based on their data privacy 
concerns? 
 
2. Methods  
In order to collect suitable data for this study, an 
online survey was conducted. This way it was possible 
to reach as many participants from the European Union 
and the USA as possible. The origin of fitness tracking 
users can impact their attitude towards data privacy [2, 
3, 21] and should be considered as an influencing 
factor during the interpretation of the results; especially 
considering the fundamentally different data protection 
history and regulations in the USA and the EU [10]. 
The survey targeted not only current users of fitness 
tracking technologies, but also former users and non-
users, who also might have data privacy concerns.  
The online survey started with questions about the 
use of activity tracking applications and wearables, as 
well as their usage frequency and duration. Inquired 
was also the general opinion on (online) data privacy 
(“I am not concerned about security on the Internet, 
e.g. people finding out what websites I visit or getting 
to know my real identity,” and “I do not care what 
companies whose services or applications I use do with 
my (personal) data”), which could be valued on a 5-
point Likert scale. These questions provided data to 
include further factors possibly influencing privacy-
related concerns about fitness tracking applications as 
well as the perceived sensitivity of data pieces 
collected by fitness tracking technology. 
Seven items were formulated to inquiry 
participants’ data privacy-related concerns about 
fitness tracking applications (e.g., misuse of data by the 
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company). The questions could also be answered on a 
5-point Likert scale. Five of the seven items were 
adopted from Lidynia, Schomakers, and Ziefle [19], 
who among others investigated the data privacy 
concerns of fitness tracking users and non-users in 
Germany. The other two items were added based on 
the research about involvement of heath insurances and 
possible third parties inferences [14, 17, 26]. All three 
types of participants (user, former users, and non-user 
of activity tracking applications) had to answer those 
questions.  
In order to measure the perceived sensitivity of 
different data types, the following data pieces were 
adopted from the work by Lidynia, Brauner, and Ziefle 
[18:45]: “Step count,” “Pulse,”* “GPS,”* “Calories,”* 
“Blood pressure,” “Stairs,”* “Standing hours,” “Sleep 
analysis,”* “BMI,”* “Blood sugar,” and “Weight.” 
Data pieces marked with “*” were labeled differently 
than in research by Lidynia, Brauner, and Ziefle [18] in 
order to clarify the meaning of the data pieces to the 
survey participants. Considering the functionalities of 
activity tracking technologies, further data pieces were 
added: menstrual cycle, completed workouts, fitness 
level/experience points, trophies, badges, lost and won 
challenges, real name, gender, birthday, e-mail address, 
contacts/friends, and joined groups. All in all, the 
survey included 23 data pieces, which had to be 
assessed by all three groups of participants. The data 
pieces were grouped into the categories: personal data, 
health-related data, activity data and progress data. The 
rating scale for each data piece ranged from “1—not 
sensitive at all. I would make it public” to “5—Very 
sensitive. I don’t want anyone to know it.” Here, also 
the answer possibility “I don’t know what it is” 
(especially for non-users) or “Not applicable” (e.g., 
information piece being “menstrual cycle” had to be 
answered by male participants) were included.  
The survey was pretested by six participants, two 
non-users and four current or former users of activity 
tracking technologies. Three pretesters were males and 
three were females. After the pretest was concluded, 
the survey was slightly modified in regard to language 
(e.g., statements formulated more objectively), 
clarification of any ambiguities, adding of open 
questions for further remarks, and making the survey 
more user-friendly by different positioning and 
segmentation of the questions.  
The online survey was non-probabilistically 
distributed from February 26, 2019, until May 28, 
2019. It was spread through different social media 
channels, both private profiles and social media groups 
(e.g., Facebook, Reddit, Twitter, or Xing), scientific 
communities (ASIS&T), or portals for survey sharing 
(SurveyCircle, SurveyTandem). 
The collected data was cleaned—incomplete 
answers and answers provided by pretesters were 
excluded, and the data was recoded into numerical 
values with the Syntax of IBM SPSS Statistics 25. The 
data collected from answers marked on the Likert scale 
was handled as ordinal.  
In order to answer the first two research questions, 
the Kruskal-Wallis H Test and a subsequent post-hoc 
test were conducted to investigate the differences in 
perceived data sensitivity and data privacy concerns 
between three groups of participants (users, non-users, 
and former users of fitness tracking applications). 
Kruskal-Wallis H Test is a rank-based nonparametric 
test used to determine if there are statistically 
significant differences between two or more groups of 
an independent variable on a continuous or ordinal 
dependent variable [29]. It is adequate for our approach 
and collected data since the dependent variables 
(perceived data sensitivity and data privacy concerns) 
are measured on an ordinal scale. In order to determine 
which group(s) exactly are different from which other 
group(s), a post-hoc test—all pairwise comparisons 
using Dunn's [8] procedure with a Bonferroni 
adjustment, was conducted [29]. 
In order to determine the characteristics of possible 
subgroups of fitness tracking applications’ users based 
on their perceived data sensitivity as well as data 
privacy concerns, the K-means clustering procedure 
was conducted. The K-means clustering algorithm was 
run for a range of K values in order to determine the 
most suitable one. Since the scale of the included 
ordinal variables ranges only from 1 to 5, the most 
distinctive group differences were given for K=3. 
 
3. Results 
Out of 777 online survey participants, 649 
completed the survey (83.53%). Only participants who 
stated to be from the USA or the EU (N=590) were 
included in further analysis. The origin of fitness 
tracking users was considered as possibly influencing 
factor during the interpretation of the results. 
The descriptive information about the sample is 
listed in Table 1. The distribution by gender is almost 
balanced (with 56% female participants). The survey 
addressed not only users of fitness tracking 
applications (55.9%), but also formers users (9%) and 
non-users (35%). The age distribution is satisfactory, 
since both, elderly (over 60) and young adults (up to 23 
years old), are represented within the sample. The 
participants of the survey had to indicate their year of 
birth. For further analysis a categorization into four 
generations, based on research on inter-generational 
differences in digital media usage [9, 10], was 
conducted. The four generations include: Silver Surfers 
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(born before 1959, hence at least 60 years old), Gen X 
(or Digital Immigrants, born between 1960 and 1979, 
hence 40-59 years old), Gen Y (also Digital Natives or 
Millennials, born between 1980 and 1995; between 24 
and 39 years old), and finally, Gen Z (born after 1996, 
hence, up to 23 years old).  
 
Table 1. Demographic information (N=590). 
 Freq. % 
Origin 
EU 477 80.8% 
USA 113 19.2% 
Gender 
Female 331 56.1% 
Male 253 42.9% 
Other 6 1.0% 
Fitness Tracking Application 
Current Users 330  55.9% 
Non-Users 207 35.1% 
Former Users 53 9.0% 
Generation 
Silver Surfers  55 9.3% 
Gen X  115 19.5% 
Gen Y  327 55.4% 
Gen Z  93 15.8% 
 
The inclusion of non-users in the survey gives us a 
third perspective on the perceived data sensitivity and 
data privacy concerns with regard to fitness tracking. 
However, their answers can be influenced by further 
factors like inexperience with fitness tracking or 
disinterest in fitness activity in general. The possible 
distortion of the results by non-users’ lacking 
knowledge about different data pieces etc. was 
minimized by inclusion of the answer possibility “I 
don’t know”. 
In order to verify, if the participating non-users are 
at all physically active, which might have an influence 
on their attitude towards fitness tracking in general, the 
Kruskal-Wallis H Test was conducted to determine any 
significant differences between users, non-users, and 
former users regarding their “daily activity level” 
(from “predominantly not active, e.g., due to an office 
job,” to “highly active”) and their fitness or exercise 
intensity. As for the daily activity level (ranging from 1 
to 5), the median equals 3 (“moderately active”) for all 
three groups, there is, however, a significant difference 
in the distribution between current users (Mean 
Rank = 317.10) and non-users (Mean Rank = 263.31), 
H(2) = 14.058, p = .001. As for the question about how 
often do the participants exercise (frequency ranging 
from 1 to 8), the differences in medians are rather 
small. For current users the median equals 7 
(“exercising 3 or more times per week”), whereas for 
former users and non-users the median equals 6 
(“exercising 1-2 times per week”). There are, however, 
significant differences in the distributions, 
H(2) = 36.268, p < .001, between current users (Mean 
Rank = 327.70) and non-users (Mean Rank = 240.20) 
(p < .001) as well as between former users (Mean 
Rank = 310.98) and non-users (p = .016). Even though 
there are significant differences in fitness or exercise 
activity, on average the non-users of fitness tracking 
technologies are still quite active (exercising 1-2 times 
per week), which indicates a general interest in fitness 
(just not fitness tracking). 
 
3.1. Perceived data sensitivity (RQ1) 
The first research question concerns the differences 
in perceived data sensitivity by users, non-users, and 
former users of the fitness tracking applications. The 
results of the Kruskal-Wallis H Test for perceived 
sensitivity of “personal data” (Table 2) indicates 
significant differences in distributions for only two 
data pieces— “gender” and “interest groups”. A post-
hoc test revealed statistically significant differences 
between users and non-users in both cases. When 
looking at the mean perceived sensitivity values for all 
groups (medians), there are barely any differences, 
except for “gender”. The users and former users 
perceive those pieces of information as rather not 
sensitive, whereas non-users perceive them as neutral.  
There are more significant differences in the 
distribution of the perceived sensitivity of health-
related data (continued in Table 2). Except for the 
information about “menstrual cycle” (sensitive for all 
three groups), the perceived sensitivity of all remaining 
information pieces is different between users and non-
users. Moreover, there is a significant difference 
between former users and non-users for the data pieces 
“heart rate” and “sleeping times”. When considering 
the mean perceived sensitivity, the non-users valued 
“calories intake” and “heart rate” higher than former 
and current users, who perceive them as neutral. 
Interestingly, current users and non-users perceive 
“blood pressure” and “sleeping times” as rather 
sensitive, whereas the former users have a neutral 
attitude towards them.  
Regarding the activity and progress data, all three 
groups agree on high sensitivity of GPS data (median 
of 5 for all groups, no significant differences in 
distribution). For the remaining data pieces, there are 
significant differences between users and non-users, 
and additionally between former users and non-users 
for the information about “step count”. Except for GPS 
data, users and former users perceive all remaining 
activity and progress data as neutral (median of 3). 
Non-users also perceive most of the data pieces as 
neutral, except for the “step count” (interestingly seen 
as very sensitive, median equals 5), “fitness level or 
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experience points” as well as “lost challenges” (rather 
sensitive, median equals 4). Interestingly, even though 
non-users perceive the information about “lost 
challenges” as rather sensitive, their perception of the 
information about “won challenges” is neutral (median 
equals 3). 
 
 
 
Table 2. Differences in perceived sensitivity of different data piece by mean ranks (MR) and medians (Mdn). 
   Users (Y) 
Non-Users 
(N) 
Former  
Users (F) 
Kruskal-
Wallis H Test 
Post-Hoc  
Test 
Pe
rs
on
al
 d
at
a 
Real  
name 
MR 
Mdn 
277.53 
4 (n=325) 
312.17 
4 (n=202) 
287.42 
4 (n=53) 
H(2) = 5.714 
p = .057 - 
Gender MR Mdn 
274.20 
2 (n=327) 
322.87  
3 (n=203) 
277.81 
2.5 (n=52) 
H(2) = 11.621 
p = .003 Y- N p = .002 
Birthday MR Mdn 
281.14 
4 (n=328) 
310.42 
4 (n=202) 
283.34 
4 (n=52) 
H(2) = 4.272  
p = .118 - 
E-Mail  MR Mdn 
296.76 
4 (n=327) 
280.21 
4 (n=202) 
302.07 
4 (n=53) 
H(2) = 1.660  
p = .436 - 
Contacts, 
friends 
MR 
Mdn 
280.29 
5 (n=327) 
306.20 
5 (n=202) 
304.64 
5 (n=53) 
H(2) = 4.264  
p = .119 - 
Interest  
groups 
MR 
Mdn 
274.66 
4 (n=329) 
320.44 
4 (n=202) 
296.75 
4 (n=53) 
H(2) = 10.042 
p = .007 Y - N p = .005 
H
ea
lth
-r
el
at
ed
 d
at
a 
Calories  
intake 
MR 
Mdn 
270.88 
3 (n=322) 
324.52 
4 (n=205) 
278.09 
3 (n=53) 
H(2) = 13.835 
p = .001 Y - N p = .001 
Burned  
calories 
MR 
Mdn 
269.87 
3 (n=327) 
331.45 
3 (n=205) 
287.00 
3 (n=53) 
H(2) = 17.662 
p < .001 Y - N p < .001 
Heart  
rate 
MR 
Mdn 
278.19 
3 (n=327) 
322.67 
4 (n=203) 
259.78 
3 (n=53) 
H(2) = 11.496 
p = .003 
Y - N p = .028 
F - N p = .038 
Blood  
pressure 
MR 
Mdn 
275.28 
4 (n=325) 
320.23 
4 (n=202) 
270.50 
3 (n=53) 
H(2) = 10.384 
p = .006 Y - N p = .006 
Sleeping  
times 
MR 
Mdn 
280.13 
4 (n=326) 
321.51 
4 (n=205) 
256.34 
3 (n=53) 
H(2) = 11.084 
p = .004 
Y - N p = .013 
F - N p = .027 
BMI MR Mdn 
274.76 
4 (n=327) 
320.40 
4 (n=205) 
299.55 
4 (n=53) 
H(2) = 9.966  
p = .007 Y - N p = .005 
Weight MR Mdn 
274.02 
4 (n=328) 
319.67 
4 (n=205) 
312.81 
4 (n=53) 
H(2) = 10.686 
p = .005 Y - N p = .005 
Menstrual 
cycle 
MR 
Mdn 
216.72 
5 (n=244) 
241.01 
5 (n=159) 
208.37 
4 (n=45) 
H(2) = 5.113  
p = .078 - 
A
ct
iv
ity
 &
 p
ro
gr
es
s d
at
a 
Step  
count 
MR 
Mdn 
209.15 
3 (n=329) 
404.51 
5 (n=159) 
254.40 
3 (n=53) 
H(2) = 175.95 
p < .001 
Y - N p < .001 
F - N p < .001 
GPS  MR Mdn 
281.70 
5 (n=327) 
305.09 
5 (n=202) 
300.15 
5 (n=53) 
H(2) = 3.584  
p = .167 - 
Climbed  
stairs 
MR 
Mdn 
265.09 
3 (n=327) 
335.07 
3 (n=205) 
302.46 
3 (n=53) 
H(2) = 23.264 
p < .001 Y - N p < .001 
Standing  
hours 
MR 
Mdn 
268.89 
3 (n=325) 
325.82 
3 (n=204) 
298.01 
3 (n=53) 
H(2) = 15.446 
p < .001 Y - N p < .001 
Completed 
workouts 
MR 
Mdn 
262.61 
3 (n=325) 
337.80 
3 (n=205) 
295.08 
3 (n=53) 
H(2) = 26.553 
p < .001 Y - N p < .001 
Fitness level, 
XPs 
MR 
Mdn 
260.09 
3 (n=320) 
325.45 
4 (n=196) 
285.78 
3 (n=53) 
H(2) = 20.278 
p < .001 Y - N p < .001 
Trophies, 
badges 
MR 
Mdn 
261.86 
3 (n=324) 
326.45 
3 (n=194) 
285.54 
3 (n=53) 
H(2) = 19.645 
p < .001 Y - N p < .001 
Lost  
challenges  
MR 
Mdn 
251.02 
3 (n=315) 
333.41 
4 (n=195) 
277.01 
3 (n=53) 
H(2) = 32.779 
p < .001 Y - N p < .001 
Won 
challenges  
MR 
Mdn 
256.40 
3 (n=315) 
324.08 
3 (n=195) 
279.34 
3 (n=53) 
H(2) = 22.092 
p < .001 Y - N p < .001 
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3.2. Data privacy-related concerns about 
fitness tracking applications (RQ2) 
The second research question addresses differences 
in data privacy-related concerns (Table 3) about fitness 
tracking applications between current users, former 
users, and non-users of fitness tracking applications. 
The Kruskal-Wallis H Test revealed significant 
differences in distribution between some of the groups 
for all concerns, except for “health insurances will 
access my data and use it against me.” For the 
remaining concerns there are significant differences in 
distributions for formers users and non-users and 
additionally between current users and former users 
(for the concerns that “collected data is too sensitive” 
and “the app companies fill forward my personal data 
to third parties”). Interestingly, the former users seem 
less concerned about the listed aspects and see most of 
them as neutral (median equals 3), except for the 
concern that “it will be possible to create an exact 
profile of my movements, habits and/or preferences,” 
which they slightly agree with (median equals 4). The 
users and non-users on average agree with all the 
statements (median equals 4).  
Table 3. Differences in data privacy concerns about fitness tracking by mean ranks (MR) and medians (Mdn). 
Concerns about fitness tracking 
applications 
Users 
(Y) 
Non-Users 
(N) 
Former 
Users (F) 
Kruskal 
Wallis H Test 
Post-Hoc  
Test 
Collected data is too sensitive. MR Mdn 
285.26 
4 (n=323) 
303.99 
4 (n=194) 
212.51 
3 (n=52) 
H(2) = 13.528 
p = .001 
Y - F p = .007 
N - F p = .001 
The app companies will forward 
my personal data to third parties.  
MR 
Mdn 
286.49 
4 (n=320) 
292.76 
4 (n=196) 
221.19 
3 (n=49) 
H(2) = 8.558  
p = .014 
Y - F p = .020 
N - F p = .013 
Health insurance will access my 
data and use it against me. 
MR 
Mdn 
280.26 
4 (n=322) 
292.55 
4 (n=193) 
251.21 
3 (n=48) 
H(2) = 2.713  
p = .258 - 
The app companies will misuse 
my data. 
MR 
Mdn 
273.73 
4 (n=318) 
300.64 
4 (n=194) 
243.96 
3 (n=48) 
H(2) = 6.428  
p = .040 N - F p = .074 
I have no control over what will 
happen to my data. 
MR 
Mdn 
280.19 
4 (n=322) 
306.82 
4 (n=197) 
230.01 
3 (n=50) 
H(2) = 10.022  
p = .007 N - F p = .007 
It will be possible to create an 
exact profile of my movements, 
habits and/or preferences. 
MR 
Mdn 
282.35 
4 (n=322) 
299.05 
4 (n=195) 
235.90 
4 (n=50) 
H(2) = 6.585  
p = .037 N - F p = .032 
There will be interference risks 
from hackers and other 
unauthorized parties.  
MR 
Mdn 
284.66 
4 (n=320) 
292.13 
4 (n=194) 
231.32 
3 (n=50) 
H(2) = 6.113  
p = .047 N - F p = .044 
 
3.3. Fitness tracking user types by privacy 
concerns (RQ3) 
The final research question concerns identifying 
and characterizing subgroups of fitness tracking 
applications’ users based on their perceived sensitivity 
of different data pieces and privacy concerns.  
The K-means cluster analysis with K1=3 revealed 
three very distinctive groups of users. For better 
identification of data privacy concerns, the medians for 
each cluster and data piece were aggregated into 
groups of perception as “sensitive” (for medians 
equaling 4 or 5), “neutral” (median equaling 3) and 
“not sensitive” (medians equaling 1 or 2), see Table 4.  
The first cluster (CL1, with 64 users) includes users 
that can be described as rather cautious about data 
sensitivity, since except for “gender” (perceived as 
neutral), all remaining data pieces are regarded as 
sensitive. A more detailed differentiation between 
“sensitive” and “very sensitive” perception of data 
pieces can be gathered from Table 5. Here, we can see 
that for CL1, the most sensitive data pieces are 
“contacts or friends,” most of the health-related data 
pieces, and the GPS location.  
The second cluster (CL2, with 120 users) can be 
described as rather neutral or balanced in the valuation 
of the data pieces. Here, eleven of the data pieces 
(personal and health-related information) is perceived 
as sensitive (however, only “GPS” is valued as “very 
sensitive” (Table 5)). Most of the activity and progress 
data is perceived as neutral. The “not sensitive” 
information pieces are gender, step count, and climbed 
stairs. 
Finally, the third cluster (CL3, with 43 users) can 
be described as rather indifferent or unconcerned about 
the different data pieces. The only sensitive data seem 
to be the “e-mail”, “contacts, friends” and the “GPS” 
location (however, none of them are perceived as “very 
sensitive”). The data pieces “real name”, “birthday”, 
“interest groups”, and “menstrual cycle” are perceived 
as neutral, whereas others are seen as “not sensitive”. 
In order to detect further differences between the 
three clusters that could influence the perceived data 
sensitivity, the cluster membership of each case was 
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saved into a new variable and the Kruskal-Wallis H 
Test was conducted for these subgroups of fitness 
tracking applications’ users. Several factors, e.g., 
fitness level or origin, were investigated.  
Table 4. Results of K-means clustering procedure on perceived data sensitivity, grouped into perception as “not 
sensitive” (1-2), “neutral” (3) and “sensitive” (4-5). Abbreviations: Blood Pressure (BP), Heart Rate (HR). 
 CL1 (n=64) CL2 (n=120) CL3 (n=43) 
Se
ns
iti
ve
 
Real name, Birthday, E-Mail, 
Contacts or friends, Interest groups, 
Calories (burned/intake), HR, BP, 
Sleeping times, BMI, Weight, 
Menstrual cycle, Step count, GPS, 
Climbed stairs, Standing hours, 
Completed workouts, Fitness level 
or XPs, Trophies or badges, Lost 
challenges, Won challenges 
Birthday, E-Mail, Contacts or 
friends, Interest groups,  
HR, BP, Sleeping times, BMI, 
Weight, Menstrual cycle, GPS 
E-Mail, Contacts or friends, GPS 
N
eu
tr
al
 
Gender 
Real name, Calories (burned/intake), 
Menstrual cycle, Standing hours, 
Completed workouts, Fitness level 
or XPs, Trophies or badges, Lost 
challenges, Won challenges 
Real name, Birthday, Interest 
groups, Menstrual cycle 
N
ot
 se
ns
iti
ve
  
Gender, Step  
Count, Climbed stairs 
Gender, Calories (burned/intake), 
HR, BP, Sleeping times, BMI, 
Weight, Step count, Climbed stairs, 
Standing hours, Completed 
workouts, Fitness level or XPs, 
Trophies or badges, Lost challenges, 
Won challenges 
 
Table 5. Results of K-means clustering procedure on 
perceived data sensitivity (scale from 1 to 5). 
Data Pieces CL1 N=64 
CL2 
N=120 
CL3 
N=43 
Pe
rs
on
al
  
da
ta
 
Real name 4 3 3 
Gender 3 2 2 
Birthday 4 4 3 
E-Mail address 4 4 4 
Contacts/Friends 5 4 4 
Interest groups 4 4 3 
H
ea
lth
-r
el
at
ed
  
da
ta
  
Calories intake 4 3 2 
Burned calories 4 3 2 
Heart rate 4 4 2 
Blood pressure 5 4 2 
Sleeping times 5 4 2 
BMI 5 4 2 
Weight 5 4 2 
Menstrual cycle 5 4 3 
A
ct
iv
ity
 &
 p
ro
gr
es
s 
da
ta
 
Step count 4 2 1 
GPS  5 5 4 
Climbed stairs 4 2 2 
Standing hours 4 3 2 
Workouts 4 3 2 
Fitness level, XPs 4 3 2 
Trophies, badges 4 3 2 
Lost challenges  4 3 2 
Won challenges  4 3 2 
 
Indeed, the Kruskal-Wallis H Test revealed 
significant differences in distribution between the three 
clusters (CL1-CL3) for the fitness or exercise activity 
(ranging from 1 to 8), H(2) = 10.628, p = .005; CL1 
(Mean Rank = 93.8; Median = 6), CL2 (Mean 
Rank = 118.20; Median = 6.5) and CL3 (Mean 
Rank = 132.33; Median = 7). According to the post-
hoc test, the significant differences are given between 
CL1 and CL2 (p = .039) and between CL1 and CL3 
(p = .006).  
Further significant differences in distribution 
between the three clusters are given for the general 
attitude towards online privacy, namely “I am not 
concerned about security on the internet, e.g. people 
finding out what websites I visit or getting to know my 
real identity” (answered on a 5-point Likert scale),  
H(2) = 6.069, p = .048; CL1 (Mean Rank = 99.77; 
Median = 2), CL2 (Mean Rank = 115.92; Median = 2) 
and CL3 (Mean Rank = 129.81; Median = 3). There 
was only one significant difference between CL1 and 
CL3 (p = .047).  
The last significant difference in distributions was 
given for the general opinion on online privacy: “I do 
not care what companies whose services or 
applications I use do with my (personal) data” 
H(2) = 19.326, p < .001; CL1 (Mean Rank = 89.20; 
Median = 1), CL2 (Mean Rank = 116.79; Median = 2), 
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CL3 (Mean Rank = 141.12; Median = 2). The 
significant differences were given between CL1 and 
CL2 (p = .010) and between CL1 and CL3 (p < .001).  
According to the Kruskal-Wallis H Test, there were 
no significant differences between the three clusters 
regarding the everyday activity level, the usage 
frequency as well as usage duration of the fitness 
tracking application, and the age of the participants. In 
order to detect possible cultural differences in cluster 
membership between participants from the EU and 
from the USA, the Pearson Chi2 was calculated. 
However, there were no significant differences 
between participants from these two regions. 
The first three clusters were estimated based on the 
users’ perceived sensitivity of different data pieces. 
Another three clusters (CL4-CL6) were calculated 
based on the data privacy-related concerns regarding 
fitness tracking applications (Table 6). Here, the CL4 
(n=104) includes users agreeing with the most 
concerns. Except for the one: “collected data is too 
sensitive,” they highly agree with all the remaining 
statements (median equals 5). The next cluster, CL5 
(n=63), includes rather unconcerned users. They do not 
agree with the most statements and are neutral (median 
equals 3) with concerns about the collected data being 
too sensitive as well as the statement “it will be 
possible to create an exact profile of my movements, 
habits or preferences.” Finally, the last cluster, CL6 
(n=137), consists of users having slight concerns. They 
somewhat agree with most of the statements, except for 
the two about the collected data being too sensitive and 
the one stating that “health insurances will access my 
data and use it against me,” towards which they have a 
neutral attitude (median equals 3).  
Similar to the first three clusters, the Kruskal-
Wallis H Test was conducted for the Clusters CL4-
CL6. The results show that there are significant 
differences in distribution between the clusters for 
general online privacy concerns, namely the statement 
“I am not concerned about security on the Internet”: 
H(2) = 31.151, p < .001; CL4 (Mean Rank = 118.11; 
Median = 2), CL5 (Mean Rank = 189.06; Median = 3), 
and CL6 (Mean Rank = 161.80; Median = 2). The 
post-hoc test revealed significant differences between 
CL4 and CL5 (p < .001) and between CL4 and CL6 
(p < .001).  
There are also significant differences in the 
agreement with the statement “I do not care what 
companies whose services or applications I use do with 
my personal data,” H(2) = 34.248, p < .001; CL4 
(Mean Rank = 119.70; Median = 1), CL5 (Mean 
Rank = 195.15; Median = 2) and CL6 (Mean 
Rank = 157.78; Median = 2). According to the post-
hoc test, the significant differences are given between 
all clusters: CL4 and CL6 (p = .001), CL4 and CL5 
(p < .001), and CL6 and CL5 (p = .008).  
The tests revealed no significant differences 
between the clusters for the everyday activity level, the 
fitness or exercise level, the usage frequency and usage 
duration of the fitness tracking application as well as 
the age of the user. Furthermore, according to Pearson 
Chi2, there were no significant differences in cluster 
distributions between users from the EU and the USA. 
 
Table 6. Results of K-means clustering procedure on data privacy-related concerns regarding fitness tracking 
applications (scale from 1 to 5). 
Concerns CL4 (n=104) 
CL5 
(n=63) 
CL6 
(n=137) 
Collected data is too sensitive. 4 3 3 
The app companies will forward my personal data to third parties. 5 2 4 
Health insurance will access my data and use it against me. 5 2 3 
The app companies will misuse my data. 5 2 4 
I have no control over what will happen to my data. 5 2 4 
It will be possible to create an exact profile of my movements, habits or preferences. 5 3 4 
There will be interference risks from hackers and other unauthorized parties.  5 2 4 
4. Discussion 
How do different groups of participants perceive 
the sensitivity of various data pieces collected by 
fitness tracking technologies? And what specific 
privacy concerns do they have, when thinking about 
this technology? When comparing current users, 
former users, and non-users of fitness tracking 
applications, there are only two significant differences 
between users and non-users in perception of “personal 
information”—the sensitivity of “gender” (perceived as 
neutral or not sensitive) and “interest groups”. All 
other personal data pieces were perceived as at least 
sensitive by all groups.  
More significant differences were given for health-
related data. All groups agreed on the sensitivity of 
information about “menstrual cycle”. All remaining 
information pieces were perceived differently between 
users and non-users. In general, current users perceive 
calories (“burned” or “intake”) and “heart rate” as 
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neutral, and the remaining data pieces as sensitive. The 
non-users perceive only “burned calories” as neutral 
and rest as sensitive. Finally, the former users only 
perceive information about “BMI”, “weight”, and 
“menstrual cycle” as sensitive.  
Regarding the activity and progress data, all three 
groups agree on high sensitivity of “GPS”, which 
confirms the results by Lidynia et al. [19]. Except for 
GPS, users and former users perceive all remaining 
activity and progress data as neutral. Non-users 
perceive most of the data pieces as neutral, except for 
“step count” (very sensitive), “fitness level or 
experience points” and “lost challenges” (rather 
sensitive). Even though they perceive “lost challenges” 
as rather sensitive information, their perception of the 
information about “won challenges” is neutral. 
The second research question addressed the data 
privacy-related concerns about fitness tracking 
applications. There were no significant differences in 
distribution between the three groups for the statement 
“health insurances will access my data and use it 
against me.” In general, the former users seem less 
concerned about the aspects and see most of them as 
neutral, except for the concern that “it will be possible 
to create an exact profile of my movements, habits 
and/or preferences,” which they slightly agree with. 
The users and non-users on average agree with all the 
statements. Here, an interesting question arises, why 
the former users stopped using these applications or 
wearables and whether any privacy-related concerns 
played a role. Since users in this investigation still 
appear to have some reservations about data privacy, 
but continue using the fitness tracking technologies, it 
might not be a key aspect, when making a decision to 
stop or continue using the technology.  
The third research question regarded potential 
subgroups of fitness tracking applications’ users based 
on their (a) perceived data sensitivity and (b) data 
privacy-related concerns about fitness tracking 
applications. The first K-means clustering procedure 
(K1=3) yield three distinctive subgroups of users: CL1 
(“concerned users”, n=64), CL2 (“neutral users”, 
n=120), and CL3 (“unconcerned users”, n=43). The 
“concerned users” indeed perceive all data pieces as 
(very) sensitive, except for “gender” (neutral). The 
“neutral users” are more balanced in their perception, 
as only “GPS” was perceived by them as “very 
sensitive”, whereas 11 data pieces (personal and 
health-related information) as “sensitive”. They 
perceive most of the activity and progress data as 
neutral and information like “gender”, “step count” and 
“climbed stairs” as “not sensitive”. Finally, the 
“unconcerned users” do not perceive any of the 
information pieces as “very sensitive”, and valued only 
three data pieces (“e-mail”, “contacts or friends” and 
“GPS”) as “sensitive” and 4 data pieces (name, 
birthday, interest groups, menstrual cycle) as “neutral”. 
They perceive the remaining information as “not 
sensitive.” The differences between these three clusters 
are not limited to the perceived data sensitivity.  
Subsequent Kruskal-Wallis H Test revealed that the 
“unconcerned users” are on average the most active 
ones (regarding “fitness or exercise” activity), followed 
by “neutral users”. It could also mean that users of 
activity tracking technologies, who are very active, 
might not fear the “publicity” of the collected data that 
supports their healthy lifestyle. As one would probably 
expect, users who are generally doubtful about data 
privacy online, are also more concerned about the 
sensitivity of different data pieces. Their perceived 
sensitivity of data might be this high due to (perceived) 
lack of safe (data) environment, where personal data is 
protected from hackers and other misuse, and due to 
very limited (or non-existent) trust in the companies 
who have custody of the data. For example, the 
“concerned users” tend to disagree more with the 
statement “I am not concerned about security on the 
internet” than the “unconcerned users” (who are rather 
neutral towards it). Furthermore, the “concerned users” 
tend to strongly disagree with the statement “I do not 
care what companies whose services or applications I 
use do with my (personal) data,” whereas “neutral 
users” and “unconcerned users” only somewhat 
disagree. Interestingly, there are no significant 
differences between the three user groups regarding 
age as well as the usage duration and usage frequency 
of the fitness tracking application. Finally, there was 
no significant association between the cluster 
membership and the origin of the users. 
The second clustering procedure (K2=3) involved 
users’ data privacy-related concerns about fitness 
tracking applications. The identified subgroups 
include: “highly concerned users” (CL4, n=104, 
strongly agreeing with almost all statements), 
“unconcerned users” (CL5, n=63, not agreeing with 
most of the statement or being neutral), and “slightly 
concerned users” (CL6, n=137, somewhat agreeing 
with most of the statements). Further differences 
between these three subgroups regarded the general 
online privacy concerns, which were again higher for 
the cluster with “highly concerned users”. 
Interestingly, there were no significant differences 
between the clusters regarding the usage frequency and 
usage duration of the fitness tracking application, the 
age of the user as well as for the everyday activity and 
the fitness or exercise level. There were also no 
significant differences in distributions between users 
from the EU and the USA, indicating a rather similar 
distribution of data related unconcerns between users 
from these two regions.  
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